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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

July 25, 1985

Via LDX

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MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

BG GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, Friday, July 26, 1985 (C)

A National Security Council Meeting on U.S. - South Africa relations, focussing principally on the internal situation in South Africa and the southern Africa regional peace process, is scheduled for Friday, July 26, 1985, from 10:00 AM to 11:00 AM in the Cabinet Room. (S)

Attached is a State Department background paper on the issues, and an agenda for the meeting. (U)


William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Tab A State Background Paper
Tab B Agenda

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SECRET/SENSITIVE**SOUTHERN AFRICA STATUS REPORT****I. GLOBAL/REGIONAL POLICY**

U.S. policy in southern Africa is part of the President's firm intention to increase our influence where we are in competition with the Soviets, while at the same time turning back the gains made by the Soviets in Africa in the 1970s and establishing a firm basis for our relations with the continent. Our objectives are to: (1) accelerate movement away from apartheid in South Africa, (2) lessen regional violence, (3) achieve Namibian independence under UNSCR. 435, (4) bring about the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and (5) help achieve peace in Mozambique and further move that country away from Soviet influence. The alternative is continued turmoil, which the Soviets readily exploit.

Until recent South African actions, cross-border violence had been dramatically reduced due to the U.S.-brokered Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa and the Lusaka Agreement between Angola and South Africa. Similarly, there has been forward movement on Namibian independence, including the commitment of all parties to Resolution 435 and Angolan acceptance of the need for Cuban troop withdrawal. Our efforts of the past four years culminated last March in the presentation to both the Angolans and South Africans of a "synthesis" of the positions of both sides designed to focus the talks on a single document. Our "synthesis" provides for the withdrawal of 24,000 Cuban troops from Angola during the first year, with the remaining 6,000 restricted to north of the 13th parallel and withdrawn during the second year.

Our approach proceeds from the assumptions that South Africa and Angola cannot achieve security without a negotiated settlement. Angola in particular has steadily lost ground to Savimbi over the past two years, even though there is little likelihood the MPLA will be overwhelmed in its Cuban-supported urban bastions. South Africa cannot escape from its costly Namibian war and advance its international prospects absent a settlement. It has further been our assumption that an agreement on Cuban withdrawal will force Luanda to come to terms with UNITA. Savimbi fully understands our approach and has no other to offer. We have no basis to force power-sharing in the absence of a breakthrough in the negotiations. These assumptions remain as valid today as in the past--there will be no peace without US diplomatic involvement.

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Recent South African behavior has raised serious questions whether the SAG is still committed to the peace process or whether it may be using it as camouflage for other, more violent, scenarios. A decision to proceed with an "interim government" in Namibia was shortly followed by an abortive SA raid against Gulf Oil facilities in Cabinda, an argumentative and negative response to our March "synthesis" on Cuban troop withdrawal, and a hot-pursuit raid against SWAPO units in southern Angola on June 28. There is evidence that the SAG has sought to disinform Jonas Savimbi about the true substance of the US "synthesis." On June 14, South African commandos raided ANC targets in Gaborone, and the SAG reasserted its right to do so wherever, in its judgment, a government failed to act on its own. This pattern of negative actions raises serious questions; it is imperative we test whether SAG moves are an aberration or a strategic shift.

In Mozambique, Machel has expelled hundreds of ANC guerrillas and made steps toward the West in many political and economic areas. He has also carried out his pledge to us to deny direct military basing or access to the Soviets and is moving cautiously away from Mozambique's Marxist economic system. However, our efforts are seriously hindered by the continuing RENAMO insurgency, which South Africa substantially resupplied before the signing of Nkomati. However, after initial ambiguity, the Botha government is now firmly supporting Machel. The British are providing modest military support to Mozambique, and our Western allies are helping economically. All parties, including South Africa, look to us to do more for Mozambique.

II. SOUTH AFRICA INTERNAL

The apparent turn towards a more truculent approach regionally is paralleled internally by the determination of the Botha government to signal to its supporters and foes that it will sustain firm control even as it continues to pursue its reform agenda. The result is a situation in which unprecedented change coincides with equally unprecedented and sustained township unrest and ruthless repression. (Since last September, 460 blacks have died, of which 350 were killed by police.) Well aware that the reality of black urbanization has made nonsense of the old pretense that black political participation can be dealt with in the context of rural homelands, the SAG now recognizes that it cannot devise new formulas without consulting with representative blacks but is frustrated to find that its

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acts of repression prevent such dialogue from taking place. Caught in this dilemma, P.W. Botha's response to foreign, including American, criticism has become increasingly testy. As the images of repression blot out the story of reform (which Botha sees himself pursuing to the limit of what his white political traffic can bear), he feels deprived of international credit he thinks he deserves. Convinced that the ANC is manipulating the unrest, he is prepared to crack down hard, international reaction notwithstanding.

The effect has been to add to our problems on the Hill.

III. LEGISLATIVE SITUATION

The present legislative situation revolves around two Congressional initiatives: repeal of the Clark Amendment and South African sanctions. The Senate has voted for a repeal of Clark; we support House action and are assessing with the House leadership prospects for repeal. We failed in the House in 1981 and do not want the President to be embarrassed and the United States weakened by a further defeat. Clark repeal is important as a principle, and it will add pressure on the MPLA. In the short term, however, repeal will shock Luanda and the Africans.

We face South African sanctions legislation in both Houses and have taken a firm position opposing punitive economic measures such as those in the Kennedy-Gray bill that passed the House in June. Measures prohibiting new investment, gold coin imports, bank loans and all computer sales run counter to our foreign policy approach (and the interests of blacks and US firms). They also conflict with world-wide US financial and commercial policy. Senate Republicans, led by Dole and Lugar, have proposed a moderate alternative containing a mix of positive and negative elements. We have not endorsed it but have urged our Senate friends to hold the line and go no further or risk a veto. Prospects are not helped by recent SAG actions as well as domestic violence.

IV. NEXT STEPS

Without a cooperative relationship with the SAG on southern Africa, it will be difficult to advance our regional strategy. Our increasingly worried Allies have no alternative and are watching intently our domestic debates as well as our current, chilled relations with the SAG. The African Front Line States would like us to adopt a far tougher position with the SAG, but they also worry about what happens if we fail to get Pretoria back to the table.

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We are now in the process of testing SAG intentions. In the wake of Ambassador Nickel's recall, we are seeking from Pretoria a serious indication that the SAG is prepared to resume working with us. This would be followed by a meeting at senior levels to pin down a cooperative strategy which keeps the SAG working for a Namibia settlement and a reduction in regional violence. We are making it clear to the SAG that we cannot restore our previous relations in the context of continued unhelpful actions on their part. Ambassador Nickel's return to post will be held back pending further clarity on these points.

If we do not get an early, positive signal from the SAG, we will propose a Presidential letter which argues for cooperation but leaves the SAG under no illusions that, without us, they will face self-destructive isolation. We judge that the recent SAG behavior pattern--including defiant, even unfriendly, attitudes toward Washington--is part bluster. They are more likely to be moved if they see that our resolve is firm, both in sustaining our policy domestically and in achieving our regional goals.

To make these points clear and underscore our interest in internal reform, we support an early Presidential radio broadcast and a speech by the Vice President. The themes would stress the unique relevance of our regional diplomacy, the need for further constructive change that ends black injustice, the case against economic sanctions, and the positive role of our programs supporting black advancement. At the same time, we are also cautioning the Africans (including the ANC) that all parties have responsibilities in controlling violence and reminding them and the SAG of our readiness to play a constructive role in encouraging dialogue.

As for the MPLA in Angola, we are reminding them that they, too, must move if there is to be progress in the negotiations. They, like Pretoria, have no better alternative than the settlement we have on offer. At present, Luanda is confused, off balance, and taken up with military and diplomatic diversions. It is important they not misread signals from South Africa and the US as letting them off the hook.

In sum, we are not yet at the point where hard choices have to be made about the viability of our regional strategy, which has assured Western initiative, reversed Soviet momentum and opened the way toward greater stability these past four years. The overall US posture in Africa and Alliance cohesion on African issues depend in major part on getting the process back on track.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Friday, July 26, 1985

The Cabinet Room

10:00 AM - 11:00 AM

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Agenda

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|-------------|----------------------------------|--|
| I. | Introduction | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |
| II. | Intelligence Overview | Director Casey
(5 minutes) |
| III. | South Africa | Deputy Secretary
Whitehead
(15 minutes) |
| | - Internal Reform Process | |
| | - Regional Peace Process | |
| IV. | Discussion | All Participants
(30 minutes) |
| V. | Concluding Comments | Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes) |

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